Gilles dorronsoro biography of donald

  • As the Obama administration formulates its plan for Afghanistan, Gilles Dorronsoro explains that without a new strategy that focuses on.
  • This is the single best account of 20th century Afghan history.
  • Having traveled and researched in Afghanistan since 1988, Gilles Dorronsoro has developed a rich and nuanced understanding of the country's history and.

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    La révolution afghane

    July 20, 2022
    This is the single best account of 20th century Afghan history. Dorronsoro masterfully carries the reader from the pre-history of the Afghan state through the immense changes in the early-mid 20th century, through the immense chaos and tumult of 1978-2001, to the early stages of the insurgency c. 2004. He first explains that the Afghan state's borders were created by imperialism–namely, British and Tsarist Russian–which rendered it dependent upon external powers to retain internal control. In other words, the state was always weak and thus had to resort to (often horrific) violence to pursue its ends. This precedent was inherited and unfortunately carried on by the PDPA in their rushed revolution, which was possible only with intense force since the party lacked any roots in the countryside–that is, the majority of Afghan society. Naturally, in face of abuses, the countryside revolted which incurred even more abuses, repeat ad nauseum. Thus, Afghanistan was flung into a war of the countryside against the cities, particularly Kabul, the heart of the Democratic Republic. In the meanwhile, the Soviets grew increasingly nervous at the 'adventurism' of their nominal allies in Afghanistan–especially when these 'allies' began killing each other, cu

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    Interview: Gilles Dorronsoro

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    WATCH Propose EXCERPT

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  • gilles dorronsoro biography of donald

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    In a new Q&A, Gilles Dorronsoro discusses the best use of reinforcements, what's necessary to build a stable Afghan state, and how to define success before withdrawal.

    What is the Obama administration’s Afghanistan policy?

    The process of policymaking has been, in a way, difficult to understand since a few months.  First, for obvious political reasons, Obama felt obliged to be tough about Afghanistan. So, the idea was to send reinforcements.  And he announced that officially in January, that 17,000 men and women were sent to Afghanistan.  But where?  It’s complicated.  It’s at the same time, there was no new strategy.  So there was the decision to send reinforcements without really having finished the strategic review.  And we are here right now; we are waiting for this redefinition of strategy in Afghanistan.

    Is a “surge” of troops the answer?

    People tend to speak about this reinforcement as the first one—“surge,” a surge like in Iraq.  But actually, it’s not true.  In 2001 and 2002, there were less than 20,000 international coalition troops in Afghanistan. Now, with the reinforcements, at the end of the year we could be near 100,000. So, actually, it’s not the first surge.  It’s the fifth or sixth surge in Afghanis